Making an impact?

In the world of social science research, there is ever increasing pressure on academics to be able to show that their research makes an impact, with impact being built into grant applications, at least for some funders like the Economic and Social Research Council through 'Pathways to Impact' statements. Indeed, in my latest study on 'good' police custody, impact is an integral part of it, in that one of the aims of the research is produce a set of benchmarks setting out what the research shows about 'good' police custody practices and, in addition, create a survey tool for police forces to monitor their performance against these benchmarks on an on-going basis.

The focus on impact is laudable. Indeed, one of the reasons why I became an academic was in the hope that in some small way my research would be able to make a difference to someone's life and to society, more generally. I still hang on to that - perhaps idealistic - dream. At the same time, there is definitely a debate to be had about the potentially stifling effects of the growing attention paid to impact in the social sciences. My concern is that the focus on impact may obscure the quest for understanding, knowledge and for learning, which are all laudable aims in themselves and which were also part of the reason why I became an academic. 

My other concern is that the focus on impact might also consign theory and the more scholarly aspects of social science research to the cutting-room floor, at least until busy academics can find the time to pick up these pieces again and mould them into publications for consumption by our peers. Yet, theory should be at the heart of any academic discipline as it can be used to test, refute and confirm hypotheses, but can also lead to a development of theory. Though, the exact role played by theory in research is contentious, its centrality to research is not.

 Anyway, I digress, what I wanted to write is that in a few small ways I think my research is slowly percolating its way through the ether and is beginning to make an impact. First of all, I was delighted to hear the news that the provision of appropriate adults was to be extended to 17 years olds through a revision in the PACE Codes of Practice in October 2013. An anomaly in the law meant that, hitherto, 17 year olds were classified as adults in the police station, unlike in other parts of the criminal justice system. The report that I researched and wrote research for the Howard League on the overnight detention of children is one of the few studies to have flagged up this important issue and I would hope, therefore, that it was used to contribute to the public debate and subsequent change in government policy.  

Second, today, I rather excitedly discovered that my research about access to legal advice in police stations (Skinns, 2011) was included in discussions about the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013:Equality Impact Assessment. In particular, it has been used in discussions about when a person's right of access to a solicitor arises, how this is communicated to the person and the circumstances in which this right can be waived, taking into account the likely vulnerabilities of detainees. Let’s hope that these provisions are adopted in law in the near future.

 I hope that my new research on ‘good’ police custody will also make a similar, if not greater contribution to the world of policing and beyond, though it will probably be a few years before I am in a position to judge this. Watch this space.

Reasons to celebrate

I was delighted to see in the news yesterday that following a debate in the House of Lords, the plans in the Legal Aid and Sentencing Bill to introduce means-testing to determine suspects' eligibility for custodial legal advice have been dropped. This really is something to celebrate. Aside from the practical concerns about the police and suspects being hard-pressed to confirm a suspects financial status, within the confines of a police investigation, publicly-funded custodial legal advice is an absolute must in a jurisdiction such as England and Wales where suspects have only a qualified not an absolute right to silence. This means that negative inferences can be drawn from a suspects silence and that only a legal advisor can properly advise a suspect about whether remaining silent is in their best interests, bearing in mind that they are only suspects and may well be innocent.

It is only by looking at what happens elsewhere can we really appreciate the importance of the right to publicly-funded legal advice for all suspects in the police station in England and Wales. In my recent British-Academy funded comparative study of police custody in England and Wales, Ireland and a jurisdiction each in the U.S. and Australia, there were clear differences. In England and Ireland there was a qualified right to silence, meaning that adverse inferences could be drawn, for example, if they failed to reveal something in interview that they later relied on in court. By contrast, in the Australian and American jurisdictions there was an absolute right to silence. In theory, exercising this right to silence in the American jurisdiction means that the police have to terminate the interview and cannot ask the suspect to be interviewed again.

It was only in England and Wales that suspects had access both in theory and practice to publicly-funded legal advice in the police station. This right existed, in theory, for some suspects and some of the time in Ireland and the Australian jurisdiction, though some of the staff I spoke to were unclear about who was entitled to receive it and there appeared to be limited up-take of it. In the American jurisdiction whilst suspects were informed of their right to legal advice including from a public defender, in practice, this right was only available on arraignment. Overall, this meant that there were few lawyers at the police station in Ireland or in the jurisdictions in Australia and America, whilst lawyers are much more visible in police stations in England, if not in person over the telephone.

The variations between the four jurisdictions in terms of the right to silence is fundamental to understanding why the right to publicly-funded legal advice for all in the police station is so important in England. Without it, there is a greater risk that someone might be convicted partly because they remained silent. Kenneth Clarke may well be right that England has a generous legal aid system, but this is not only justified, but also necessary in view of the qualified right to silence.

Legal aid budget to face the axe

http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/oct/16/george-osborne-prisons-legal-aid

Forthcoming talks

I will be talking at the Centre for Criminal Law at University College London on 1 November 2010 on 'Legal advice in the police station: past, present and future'.

What better time to be talking about this given the impending cuts to the legal aid budget? Do come along if you can.

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/criminal-law/index.shtml?events